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Murder in Mecklenburg-To the Issue Go the Spoils
One early summer morning in 1980, Isam Misenheimer was in his
kitchen, cooking up country ham.' His son John appeared, and the men
spoke. They may have fought; at some point John pulled from under his
jacket a .22 caliber rifle shortened by the removal of its stock. A bullet raced
through the older man's brain and soon he lay dead or dying, a small pool of
blood staining the floor around his head.2 John now is serving time at Central
Prison in Raleigh.3
Isam Misenheimer left a will dividing his estate equally among John and
John's seven brothers and sisters.4 The following year, John's siblings sued for
a declaratory judgment5 barring John from taking anything under Isam's will.
The trial court agreed with plaintiffs that John was barred by North Carolina's
slayer statute from taking his one-eighth share of his father's estate. The court,
however, rejected plaintiffs' argument that the slayer statute also barred John's
two sons, ruling instead that they could take their father's share by substitu-
tion.6 The North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision
in Misenheimer v. Misenheimer,7 thus determining that the slayer statute will
not deny a slayer's issue benefits from a death the slayer has caused.
The need for determining the rights of the slayer's issue arose because two
succession statutes governed the case. The slayer statute, North Carolina Gen-
eral Statutes sections 31A-3 to 31A-15, provides for forfeiture of the slayer's
share through the fiction that the slayer had predeceased his testator-victim. 8
Section 31-42, the anti-lapse statute, provides for the passing of any estate or
I. Record at 32 (testimony of Sharon Misenheimer), State v. Misenheimer, 304 N.C. 108,
282 S.E.2d 791 (1981) Isam was shot on the morning of June 10, 1980. Ivan Misenheimer lived
and died in Charlotte.
2. Id. at 57 (testimony of Dr. Hobart Wood, medical examiner); Id. at 84 (voluntary state-
ment of John Misenheimer, June 10, 1980). The North Carolina Supreme Court found no error in
the trial court's finding of first-degree murder. State v. Misenheimer, 304 N.C. 108, 111, 282
S.E.2d 791, 794 (1981).
3. Record at 3, Misenheimer v. Misenheimer, 62 N.C. App. 706, 303 S.E.2d 415 (1983).
Unless otherwise noted, subsequent references in the text and notes to Misenheimer refer to the
1983 wills case of Misenheimer v. Misenheimer. Misenheimer v. Misenheimer, 62 N.C. App. 706,
303 S.E.2d 415 (1983).
4. Misenheimer v. Misenheimer, 62 N.C. App. 706, 707, 303 S.E.2d 415, 415 (1983). Isam's
will left no specific gifts. After payment of debts, funeral expenses, administration costs, and
death taxes, the will provided for distribution of all the residue to the eight named children.
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-253 to -267 (1983). The actual alignment of the parties was Don-
ald Misenheimer (John's brother and administrator of Isam's estate) against all the named benefi-
ciaries, including John, and also against John's two sons. References in the text to "the
Misenheimer plaintiffs" refer to the seven siblings who sought to bar John and his two sons from
taking under Isam's will.
6. Misenheimer v. Misenheimer, 62 N.C. App. 706, 707, 303 S.E.2d 415, 415-16 (1983).
7. 62 N.C. App. 706, 303 S.E.2d 415 (1983).
8. The slayer statute is article III of Acts Barring Property Rights, 1961 N.C. Sess. Laws 350,
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 31A-3 to -15 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1983). The relevant section of article III is
§ 31A-4 (1976):
The slayer shall be deemed to have died immediately prior to the death of the decedent
and the following rules shall apply:
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part of an estate that would otherwise fail because a beneficiary died before his
testator.9 The anti-lapse statute determines that when a beneficiary prede-
ceases the testator, the beneficiary's issue take the beneficiary's share by substi-
tution.' 0 In reconciling the slayer statute with the anti-lapse statute, the
question was this: If the slayer is deemed to have predeceased the testator for
the purpose of depriving the slayer of any share in the testator's estate, should
the slayer also be deemed to have predeceased the testator for the purpose of
the anti-lapse statute?
A devise lapses when a named beneficiary cannot or will not take the gift
at the testator's death.'" At common law, a lapsed legacy could pass under the
residuary clause of the will, but a lapsed devise had to be treated as intestate
property.'2 North Carolina's statutory provision against lapses grew out of
1844 legislation providing that lapsed devises could pass under a will's residu-
ary clause.' 3 The North Carolina anti4apse statute now provides that, if pos-
sible and if the will shows no contrary intent, 14 a beneficiary's issue should
take the beneficiary's share by substitution when the beneficiary dies before
the testator.' 5 The statute further provides for gifts that cannot be saved from
lapsing. The anti-lapse statute provides that any specific gift that has lapsed
(1) The slayer shall not acquire any property or receive any benefit from the
estate of the decedent by testate or intestate succession or by common law or statu-
tory right as surviving spouse of the decedent.
(2) Where the decedent dies intestate as to property which would have passed
to the slayer by intestate succession, such property shall pass to others next in suc-
cession in accordance with the applicable provision of the Intestate Succession Act.
(3) Where the decedent dies testate as to property which would have passed to
the slayer pursuant to the will, such property shall pass as if the decedent had died
intestate with respect thereto, unless otherwise disposed of by the will.
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-42(a) (1976) provides for a devise or legacy to a beneficiary who
would have taken had he survived the testator, but who died before the testator did. Such a devise
or legacy passes by substitution to the beneficiary's issue, provided that (I) the beneficiary had
issue living at his own death, and (2) the beneficiary's issue would have been heir of the testator,
under the Intestate Succession Act, in the absence of a will. Section 31-42(b) provides that a
devise or legacy to a class member who predeceases the testator also passes to the beneficiary's
issue. Under subsection (b), if the beneficiary is not survived by issue, the gift devolves upon the
remaining class members who survive the testator. Subsection (b) was not relevant to Misen-
helmer, since there the testator named each of the beneficiaries. Presumably, if Isam Misenheimer
had left his residuary estate to the class "my children," the court would just as easily have found
John's sons entitled to take John's share by substitution. Section 31-42(c) provides for cases in
which subsections (a) and (b) do not apply, and a devise or legacy lapses: if there is a residuary
clause, the gift passes under it; lacking a residuary clause in the will, the gift passes as if the
testator had died intestate with respect to the gift. Further, under subsection (c), if a residuary gift
lapses with respect to one beneficiary, the gift continues in the residue for distribution to the other
residuary beneficiaries. If there are no other residuary beneficiaries, the gift passes as intestate
property. Operation of subsection (a), (b), or (c) is contingent on no contrary instruction appear-
ing in the will.
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-42(a) (1976). See supra note 9.
11. T. ATKINSON, WILLS § 140, at 777 (2d ed. 1953).
12. N. WIGGINS, NORTH CAROLINA WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN NORTH
CAROLINA § 149, at 149 (1983).
13. Id. See 1844 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 88, § 4, reprinted in B. MOORE & A. BoOS, REVISED
CODE OF NORTH CAROLINA 608 (1855).
14. A contrary intent could be shown, for example, by a gift to a beneficiary, "if he survives
me," or by a gift over to another if the beneficiary does not survive the testator. T. ATKINSON,
supra note 11, § 140, at 780.
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-42 (1976). See supra note 9.
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goes into the residuary portion of the estate, while any residuary gift that has
lapsed passes to the other residuary beneficiaries. If no other residuary benefi-
ciaries exist, the gift passes as if the testator had died intestate.1 6
In Bear v. Bear 1 7 the court of appeals indicated that the plain meaning of
the anti-lapse statute controlled any construction: subsection (a) of the statute,
which passed the testate gift intended for a predeceased beneficiary to the ben-
eficiary's issue, applied to any devise, residuary or specific. More relevant to
the facts of Misenheimer, the Bear court held that a gift is not lapsed when the
gift can pass to issue of the predeceased beneficiary. This proposition is cen-
tral to the purpose of the anti-lapse statute-to prevent lapses, not just to pro-
vide for their eventuality.' 8
The slayer statute is based on the principle that no one should profit from
his wrongdoing.19 North Carolina's slayer statute was enacted in 1961, replac-
ing inadequate existing statutes and unsatisfactory case law.20 The statutes
had been limited to cases in which one spouse had killed the other and stood
to gain from the victim's death.21 In other cases, courts had applied the equi-
table principle of the constructive trust.2 2 In the absence of an applicable stat-
ute, courts would refuse to invoke a forfeiture against a murderer, and instead
hold that the murderer held his vested interest in the victim's estate in trust for
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-42(c)(1)(b) (1976).
17. 3 N.C. App. 498, 165 S.E.2d 518 (1969). In Bear testator executed a will in 1917 and died
in 1968. The will gave the residue of the estate to two brothers, Emanuel and Sigmond. Emanuel
died before the testator, leaving two children who took Emanuel's one-half share by substitution.
Sigmond also died before the testator, but left no issue, so his half of the residue lapsed. Because
there were no other named residuary beneficiaries, Sigmond's half had to be distributed as intes-
tate property.
18. It appears to us that section (a) of the statute is designed and intended to prevent the
lapse of a devise or bequest, whether it be specific or residuary, in a situation where the
devisee or legatee who would have taken had he survived the testator predeceases testa-
tor survived by issue who survive the testator and who would have been heirs of testator
had there been no will.
Id. at 504, 165 S.E.2d at 522.
19. "Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria." See McGovern, Homicide and
Succession to Property, 68 MICH. L. REv. 65, 71 (1969). See also Dworkin, The Model ofRules, 35
U. CHI. L. REv. 14 (1967). Dworkin states that courts have applied this principle in the absence of
any preexisting rule, and that the principle illustrates a failure of positivist jurisprudence. The
principle that no one should profit from his wrongdoing was first used to defeat a devise in the
famous case of Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889). Defendant in Riggs murdered
his grandfather, and the court held that the slayer-grandson could not take anything under the
will, despite the will's provisions for a gift to the grandson, and despite the lack of any barring
provisions in New York's statutes or case law.
Riggs also served as the point of departure for an imaginative consideration of the predict-
ability of unwritten law in D'Amato, Elmer's Rule: A Jurisprudential Dialogue, 60 IoWA L. REV.
1129 (1975).
20. See N. WIGGINS, supra note 12. See generally Bolich, Acts Barring Property Rights, 40
N.C.L. REv. 175 (1962).
21. One year before the New York decision of Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188
(1889), the North Carolina Supreme Court had allowed a wife who had been accessory to her
husband's murder to take her intestate share of the husband's estate. Owens v. Owens, 100 N.C.
240, 6 S.E. 794 (1888). The legislature responded to Owens with statutes aimed at preventing a
recurrence of that result. See 1889 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 499 (repealed partially in 1959; balance
repealed in 1973).
22. See, e.g., Garner v. Phillips, 229 N.C. 160, 47 S.E.2d 845 (1948) (constructive trust ap-
plied after son murdered parents).
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the remaining beneficiaries. 23 To cover more situations in which a slayer
might benefit from his wrongdoing, the North Carolina legislature in 1961
turned to the model slayer statute that Professor Wade had proposed in
1936.24
North Carolina adopted most of Wade's model statute, but as the discus-
sion inMisenheimer indicates, the divergences from the Wade model were sig-
nificant. Wade provided that neither the slayer nor anyone claiming through
him could take as a result of the slayer's wrongdoing. 25 The North Carolina
statute provides merely that the slayer cannot benefit, without mentioning
those who might claim through him. Citing its opinion in an earlier slayer
case,26 the court wrote, "the public policy sought to be fostered by the enact-
ment of G.S. 3 IA is predicated upon the theory that the murderer himself will
not profit by his own wrongdoing, however, this principle does not extend to
those related to the slayer."'27 Most important, Wade's statute specifically pro-
vided that the anti-lapse statute would not apply to the slayer's share of the
victim's will. The omission of this provision in the North Carolina statute
strongly suggests that the anti-lapse statute should be read in conjunction with
the slayer statute.28
In Misenheimer the courts found John to be a slayer within the definition
of "slayer" in the statute,29 but the courts still had to determine who would
23. See A. ScoTr, TRUSTS §§ 492-494.4 (1967).
24. Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, 49
HARV. L. REv. 715 (1936).
25. Id. at 724.
26. Gardner v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 22 N.C. App. 404, 206 S.E.2d 818, cert. denied, 285
N.C. 658, 207 S.E.2d 753 (1974). Gardner involved a different problem from Misenheimer. Under
§ 3 lA-II of the slayer statute, the principle that the murderer shall not benefit from his wrongdo-
ing applies to insurance proceeds. In Gardner the insured slayer killed the beneficiary under the
policy, then killed himself. The court held that the slayer's mother, who was named an alternate
eneficiary in the policy, could take the proceeds.
27. Misenheimer, 62 N.C. App. at 709-10, 303 S.E.2d at 417 (citing Gardner v. Nationwide
Life Ins. Co., 22 N.C. App. 404, 409, 206 S.E.2d 818, 821, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 658, 207 S.E.2d
753 (1974)).
28. See Wade, supra note 24, at 727. Under Wade's model, "the heirs or next of kin of the
slayer may claim the property if they are entitled to it in their own right, but they cannot claim
through an ancestor who has disqualified himself by his wrong." Id.
29. A "slayer" is defined under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-3 (1976) as any person who, as a
principal or accessory in the "willful and unlawful killing of another person," (a) is found guilty,
(b) pleads guilty, or (c) pleads nolo contendere in a criminal action. In addition, subsection (d)
provides that a slayer who commits suicide or otherwise dies before being tried for the slaying,
and before settlement of the estate, can be found a slayer in a civil action. Such an action must be
brought within one year after the testator's death. Subsection (d) thus provides that in murder-
suicide cases in which the slayer cannot be tried for murder, the slayer's share of the victim's estate
will not go into the slayer's estate. One need not be a slayer under the definition of § 3 IA-3(3) to
be barred from taking under the decedent's estate. In Quick v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 287
N.C. 47, 213 S.E.2d 563 (1975), the beneficiary shot her husband. She was tried for murder, but
found guilty of involuntary manslaughter. Quick had stipulated in the subsequent suit for the
husband's insurance proceeds that she had killed her husband, and that the only issue was
whether the slayer statute barred her from taking the proceeds. Apparently, she was under the
"misapprehension that the decisive question was whether she was a slayer as defined by G.S.
§ 31A-3(3)." Id. at 56, 213 S.E.2d at 569. Since Quick's act was found to have been unwilful, she
could not have met the test of a slayer. But the court went on to apply the common law as
preserved in the statute-the broad construction provision of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-15 (1976)-
'both substantively and procedurally, as to all acts not specifically provided for in Chapter 3 IA."
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receive John's share under Isam's will. To prevent John and his two sons from
taking under the will, John's siblings raised two arguments against the trial
court's finding for John's sons. First, they argued that the slayer statute exclu-
sively controlled distribution of the estate, and that the anti-lapse statute did
not apply when the slayer merely was deemed to have predeceased the testa-
tor. Second, they argued that if the anti-lapse statute did apply, the gift to
John had lapsed and should have passed into the residue for distribution to
the other residuary beneficiaries, under the terms of section 31-42(c)(2).3 0
In rejecting the second argument, the court noted Bear,31 which had sug-
gested that the anti-lapse statute should prevent lapse whenever possible, and
thus, that the statute favors passage of the beneficiary's share to his issue over
a lapse. Thus, once the Misenheimer court decided that the anti-lapse statute
did apply, plaintiffs had to overcome the presumption that a lapse should be
avoided. They failed to overcome this presumption.
The court of appeals briefly considered plaintiffs' argument for the exclu-
sive operation of the slayer statute.32 Plaintiffs had stressed that section 31A-
15 provides that Chapter 31A applies exclusively to all acts it specifically cov-
ers. The court interpreted this argument as a cue to refer to the provision of
the slayer statute governing in the case of a slain testator, North Carolina Gen-
eral Statutes section 31A-4. Section 31A-4(3) provides that "where the dece-
dent dies testate as to property which would have passed to the slayer pursuant
to the will, such property shall pass as if the decedent had died intestate with
respect thereto, unless otherwise disposed of by the will." The court con-
cluded: "Since nothing to the contrary appears in the will of Isam R. Misen-
heimer, the anti-lapse statute is deemed a part of the will."
3 3
Thus, the court focused on the last phrase of subsection (3) without ad-
dressing the operative clause, "such property shall pass as if the decedent had
died intestate with respect thereto." This clause suggests that John's one-
eighth share should have been distributed according to the laws of intestate
succession. Since the eight named beneficiaries also would have been Isam's
heirs in intestacy, they would have shared equally in any intestate property,
except John's sons would have taken John's share by substitution. Thus,
under this construction, John's one-eighth share would have been divided
Quick, 287 N.C. at 56, 213 S.E.2d at 569. Thus, although the specific provisions of the slayer
statute did not cover cases of involuntary manslaughter, the broad construction section could be
invoked when the specific provisions of the slayer statute might otherwise fail to prevent one from
profiting from his wrongdoing. Mr. Quick's death resulted from his wife's "culpable negligence,
that is conduct incompatible with a proper regard for human life . . . . Culpable negligence
proximately resulting in death comes within the purview of the common law maxim that no one
shall be permitted to profit by his own wrong." Id. at 59, 213 S.E.2d at 570-71. Seesupra note 19.See also Note, Decedents'Estates-Fofeitures of Property Rights by Slayers, 12 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 448 (1976).
30. See supra note 9. John's defense counsel in the murder case apparently thought this was
the correct construction, and that it explained the siblings' pecuniary interest in hiring a private
prosecutor at the murder trial. Brief for Appellant at 6, State v. Misenheimer, 304 N.C. 108, 282
S.E.2d 791 (1981).
31. See supra note 17.
32. Misenheimer, 62 N.C. App. at 708, 303 S.E.2d at 416.
33. Id.
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again by eight, so that John's seven siblings each would have taken an addi-
tional one-sixty-fourth share, while John's two sons would have divided only a
one-sixty-fourth share as a result of intestate succession. 34
Admittedly, this construction lends little grace to the statutory architec-
ture. The Misenheimer court saw a mesh between the slayer and anti-lapse
statutes; although the slayer statute provides that "the slayer shall be deemed
to have died immediately prior to the death of the decedent," the anti-lapse
statute can prevent lapse or provide for passage of the slayer's share after
lapse. The first sentence of the slayer statute, however, continues, "and the
following rules shall apply:. . . (3) Where the decedent dies testate as to prop-
erty which would have passed to the slayer pursuant to the will, such property
shall pass as if the decedent had died intestate with respect thereto, unless
otherwise disposed of by the wil."' 35 Subsection (3) is surplusage if the anti-
lapse statute operates on a testate slaying victim's property, because the anti-
lapse statute itself provides for the possibility that a gift to the slayer might
pass by intestacy.36 In the anti-lapse statute, intestate succession is the final
solution, to be avoided whenever a predeceased beneficiary leaves surviving
issue, or whenever there are other residuary beneficiaries. For example, if
John Misenheimer had predeceased his father without leaving issue, under
section 31-42(c)(2) John's share of the residuary estate would have gone back
into the residue of Isam's estate for distribution to the other residuary benefi-
ciaries. 37 Under section (3) of the slayer statute, however, property "which
would have passed to. . . [John]. . . pursuant to the will. . . shall pass as if
the decedent had died intestate with respect thereto. '38 If the legislature had
wanted the courts to read the anti-lapse and slayer statues together, it would
not have written a section pertaining to wills that so contradicted the anti-
lapse statute. Instead, the legislature could have written a subsection (3) of the
slayer statute specifically applying the anti-lapse statute, or it could have re-
mained silent about wills in the slayer statute, which also would have impli-
cated the anti-lapse statute.
Nevertheless, the court of appeals' construction of the slayer and anti-
lapse statues in Misenheimer is at least consistent with its perception of public
policy-that the murderer's wrongdoing should not bar the murderer's rela-
tives from taking his share. If consideration of the slayer's children indeed
represents the legislature's will, the decision in Misenheimer gives effect to that
will. The Misenheimer decision also ensures that the treatment of bequests to
the slayer will not depend on whether the decedent leaves a will. Under the
Wade model statute, the slayer's issue are not barred from taking an intestate
share, provided they are heirs in their own right. But if the slayer is named in
the testator's will, the slayer's issue only can take a share the testator may have
34. Thus, John's seven siblings would each take a total of 9/64 of the residuary estate, while
John's sons would each take 1/128.
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-4(3) (1976).
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-42(c)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1983). See supra note 9.
37. Id.
38. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-4(3) (1976).
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given them specifically.39 The Uniform Probate Code may operate simi-
larly.40 Section 2-803 of the Code provides that, if the decedent dies intestate,
the slayer-heir's portion passes to the slayer's issue under the Code's intestate
succession provisions.4 1 If the decedent dies testate, however, and the killer is
named in the will, the killer's portion may fall back into the residue or pass on
to another residuary beneficiary.4 2 In Misenheimer the decedent had simply
written into his will the same equal distribution to his eight children that intes-
tate succession would have provided without a will. It would have been unfor-
tunate if the slayer's children's claim to part of the decedent's estate depended
not only on an act of their parent that they could not influence, but also on the
uncontrollable (and normally desirable) decision of the decedent to write a
will.
The decedent's intent is one consideration in determining whether a
slayer's issue should take the slayer's share from the victim's estate by substitu-
tion. Anti-lapse statutes are said to affect the average testator's probable in-
tentions if the testator had considered the possibility of surviving his
beneficiary.43 The intentions of a slain testator are questionable, however, be-
cause the court must speculate about what the testator would have intended
had he known the slayer would kill him. Could Isam Misenheimer have
thought, after having been shot on that fateful June morning, "I do not wish
for John or his two sons to take from my estate"? North Carolina law sup-
plants silence from the grave with a determination of public policy; if John's
sons are innocent in the death of their grandfather, they may take their father's
share.
In addition to policy considerations, a constitutional issue arises in con-
struing the slayer statute. If a slayer statute is read to bar the succession rights
of issue who claim through an ancestor slayer, a court may risk imposing the
ancient penalty of corruption of the blood.44 This penalty, which Blackstone
called an "oppressive mark of [Norman] feodal tenure," 45 extended the forfei-
ture penalty imposed on someone found guilty of treason or other felonies to
his descendants. The descendants could not claim through the convicted an-
cestor and had to take title from a more remote ancestor. Professor Wade
flatly denied that his model statute would work corruption of the blood, "since
it does not prevent heirs of the slayer from inheriting from him property which
he already owns, but merely keeps him from acquiring property in an illegal
39. See supra note 28.
40. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-803, 8 U.L.A. 172 (1983).
41. Id. Section 2-803(a) provides as follows:
A surviving spouse, heir or devisee who feloniously and intentionally kills the dece-
dent is not entitled to any benefits under the will or under this Article, and the estate of
decedent passes as if the killer had predeceased the decedent. Property appointed by the
will of the decedent to or for the benefit of the killer passes as if the killer had prede-
ceased the decedent.
42. Id. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE PRACTICE MANUAL 77 (PL Wellman 2d ed. 1977).
43. T. ATKINSON, supra note 11, § 140, at 778.
44. N. WIGGINS, supra note 12, § 203.
45. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *388.
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way."46 Technically Wade is correct, but any law that bars issue from taking
under a will by substitution because their ancestor is deemed to have prede-
ceased the testator rather than actually having predeceased him, comes as
close to a modem enactment of the corruption penalty as would legislation of
the penalty itself. Since the Constitution forbids corruption of the blood,47
any slayer statute should indicate clearly that it prevents only the wrongdoer
himself from profiting from his wrong, and not innocent parties.
Other courts have disagreed about whether slayer statutes bar the slayer's
issue from sharing in the decedent's estate. In addition to North Carolina, six
states have adopted varying forms of the Wade model slayer act.48 Of these
six, only South Dakota adopted verbatim the provisions that unquestionably
would have denied the slayer's share to his issue.4 9 At least one Pennsylvania
case, however, has held that a specific devise or bequest to the slayer would be
included in the residuary estate, and if the slayer was named as a residuary
beneficiary, his share would pass to the other residuary beneficiaries.50
Among states that have slayer statutes not based on the Wade model,
Kentucky has allowed the slayer's children to take from the decedent's estate,
holding that the legislature had not intended to punish "an innocent child." 51
In McGhee v. Banks,52 however, the Georgia Court of Appeals ruled against
reading that state's anti-lapse statute in conjunction with the slayer statute. In
McGhee a husband killed his wife. The husband had a daughter from a previ-
ous marriage who was not an heir of the murdered wife. The trial court had
applied the state anti-lapse statute53 so that the entire estate, which would
have gone to the husband under the wife's will, passed to the husband's
daughter. Because under the slayer statute, the property should have gone to
the heirs of the person killed, the court of appeals reversed. Since the hus-
band's daughter was not the wife's heir, the wife's property passed to her own
nieces and nephew.5 4 The Misenheimer plaintiffs cited McGhee as support for
their case, but the court refused to follow it.55
Ironically, a North Carolina court should have no difficulty in following
the Georgia court if faced with facts similar to McGhee. The North Carolina
46. Wade, supra note 24, at 721.
47. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3: "The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of
Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during
the Life of the Person attainted."
48. IDAHO CODE § 15-2-803 (1979); OR. REv. STAT. § 112.455-.555 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 20, § 8802 (Purdon 1975); R.I. GEN. LAws § 33-1.1-1 to -1.1-16 (1969); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 29-9-2 (1976); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 11.84.010 to .84.900 (1967).
For an exhaustive study of slayer statutes in all jurisdictions, see Maki & Kaplan, Elmer'r
Case Revisited- The Problem of the Murdering Heir, 41 OHIo ST. L.J. 905 (1980).
49. S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 29-9-2 (1976).
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52. 115 Ga. App. 155, 154 S.E.2d 37 (1967).
53. GA. CODE § 113-812 (1933) (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-103 (1982)).
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anti-lapse statute provides that when a beneficiary predeceases the testator, the
beneficiary's issue take the property, provided they also would be testator's
heirs under the Intestate Succession Act.5 6 Under the facts of McGhee the
slayer-husband's daughter was not the wife's heir, so she would not have taken
anything from the victim-wife's estate under the anti-lapse statute. John Mi-
senheimer's sons, however, were also Isam Misenheimer's heirs. If application
of the anti-lapse statute had been the only question in administering Isam's
will, John's sons could have taken John's share by substitution because they
were both John's issue and Isam's heirs.
In considering McGhee, the Misenheimer court also was unpersuaded by
the Georgia court's distinction between the actual death of a beneficiary,
which would trigger the anti-lapse statute, and the fictive prior "death" of a
slayer-beneficiary under the slayer statute. The Georgia court did not agree
that a death in words could operate as a death in deed, so it held the slayer
statute and the anti-lapse statute to operate exclusively of each other.57 The
North Carolina court had no such metaphysical inhibitions. For that, slayer's
issue in this state can be glad.
JAMES R. SAINTSING
56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-42(a) (1976). See supra note 9.
57. McGhee, 115 Ga. App. at 157-58, 154 S.E.2d at 39-40.
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